What's left to do                                 -*- outline -*-

* Next API break:
** gcry_ac_io_t
  Remove use of anonymous union.
** gcry_ac
  Consider to remove it.

* udiv-qrnbd.o should get build as *.lo [HPUX]

* Allow operation using RSA keys consisting of the OpenSSL keys.
  This requires the introduction of a parameter names (say) U which
  is calculated according to OpenSSL/PKCS#1 rules.

* Add a warning to the manual, to check that libgcrypt actually has
  been compiled with thread support when used by a threaded
  application.

* linker script test
  Write an autoconf test to check whether the linker supports a
  version script. 

* Add attributes to the MPI functions.

* cipher/pubkey.c and pubkey implementaions.
  Don't rely on the secure memory based wiping function but add an
  extra wiping.
  
* update/improve documentation
** it's outdated for e.g. gcry_pk_algo_info.
** document algorithm capabilities
** Init requirements for random
   The documentation says in "Controlling the library" that some
   functions can only be used at initialization time, but it does not
   explain what that means.  Initialization is a multi-step procedure:
   First the thread callbacks have to be set up (optional), then the
   gcry_check_version() function must be called (mandatory), then
   further functions can be used.

   The manual also says that something happens when the seed file is
   registered berfore the PRNG is initialized, but it does not say how
   one can guarantee to call it early enough.

   Suggested fix: Specify initialization time as the time after
   gcry_check_version and before calling any other function except
   gcry_control().

   All functions which modify global state without a lock must be
   documented as "can only be called during initialization time" (but
   see item 1).  Then the extraneous calls to _gcry_random_initialize
   in gcry_control() can be removed, and the comments "not thread
   safe" in various initialization-time-only functions like
   _gcry_use_random_daemon become superfluous.

* Use builtin bit functions of gcc 3.4

* Consider using a daemon to maintain the random pool
  [Partly done] The down side of this is that we can't assume that the
  random has has always been stored in "secure memory".  And we rely
  on that sniffing of Unix domain sockets is not possible.  We can
  implement this simply by detecting a special prefixed random seed
  name and divert in this case to the daemon.  There are several
  benefits with such an approach: We keep the state of the RNG over
  invocations of libgcrypt based applications, don't need time
  consuming initialization of the pool and in case the entropy
  collectros need to run that bunch of Unix utilities we don't waste
  their precious results.

* Out of memory handler for secure memory should do proper logging

  There is no shortage of standard memory, so logging is most likely
  possible.

* mpi_print does not use secure memory
  for internal variables.

* gcry_mpi_lshift is missing

* Add OAEP

* gcryptrnd.c
  Requires a test for pth [done] as well as some other tests.

* secmem.c
  Check whether the memory block is valid before releasing it and
  print a diagnosic, like glibc does.

* threads
** We need to document fork problems
  In particular that reinitialization is required in random.c
  However, there is no code yet to do it.

* Tests
  We need a lot more tests.  Lets keep an ever growing list here.
** Write tests for the progress function
** mpitests does no real checks yet.
** pthreads
  To catch simple errors like the one fixed on 2007-03-16.
** C++ tests
  We have some code to allow using libgcrypt from C++, so we also
  should have a test case.

* /dev/urandom and Solaris
  Make the configure check similar to GnuPG.

* Use aliases for symbol instead of the wrappers in visibility.c.
